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Crisis and reorganization in urban dynamics: the Barcelona, Spain, case
study
Rafael De Balanzó 1,2 and Núria Rodríguez-Planas 1
ABSTRACT. We use adaptive cycle theory to improve the understanding of cycles of urban change in the city of Barcelona, Spain,
from 1953 to 2016. More specifically, we explore the vulnerabilities and windows of opportunity these cycles of change introduced in
the release (Ω) and reorganization (α) phases. In the two recurring cycles of urban change analyzed (before and after 1979), we observe
two complementary loops. During the front loop, financial and natural resources are efficiently exploited by homogenous dominant
groups (private developers, the bourgeoisie, politicians, technocrats) with the objective of promoting capital accumulation based on
private (or private-public partnership) investments. During the back loop, change is catalyzed by heterogeneous urban social networks
(neighborhood associations, activists, squatters, cooperatives, nongovernmental organizations) whose objectives are diverse but
converge in their discontent with the status quo and their desire for a “common good” that includes social justice, social cohesion,
participatory governance, and well-being for all. The heterogeneity of these social networks (shadow groups) fosters learning,
experimentation, and social innovation and gives them the flexibility that the front loop’s dominant groups lack to trigger growing
pressures for transformation, not only within, but also across spatial and temporal dimensions, promoting panarchy. At the end, the
reorganization phase (α) becomes a competition or negotiation between potential directions and outcomes (including conservative
leanings and intentional bottom-up change) to restore the former system.
Key Words: adaptive cycle theory; back loop; Barcelona urban planning; Barcelona's urban (sustainable) design era; crisis; panarchy;
release (Ω) and reorganization (α) phases; social innovation; social justice; urban change dynamics; urban resilience
INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-2000s, resilience has become increasingly central to
international and domestic urban policy making. Climate change,
recessions, overpopulation, or migration flows resulting from
systemic environmental, economic, or social crises have affected
the evolution of the urban quality of life. With these short- and
long-term stresses to urban systems’ sustainability, gradual,
adaptive or transformational changes occur (Chaffin et al. 2016).
Importantly, a city’s resilience lies in its capacity to adapt and
transform itself to meet the needs and aspiration of its citizens,
rather than in its ability to return to its precrisis form. Hence,
there is a need to generate new strategies that transform the city
through resilient processes. However, prior to managing resilience,
urban experts ought to understand urban cycles of change and
the vulnerabilities and windows of opportunity these cycles
introduce. To put it differently, they must understand how periods
of gradual change interplay with those of rapid change and how
such dynamics interact across temporal and spatial dimensions
promoting panarchy (Gunderson and Holling 2002). This is the
main objective of our paper.

Our focus is on the socioeconomic dimension of Barcelona’s real
estate multiscale system dynamics and associated policy. During
the two front loops, financial and natural resources are efficiently
exploited by homogeneous dominant groups (private developers,
the bourgeoisie, politicians, or technocrats), with the objective of
promoting capital accumulation based on private or privatepublic partnership (PPP) investments. During the two back loops,
change is catalyzed by Barcelona’s heterogeneous urban social
networks (neighborhood associations, professional bodies,
activists, squatters, cooperatives, and nongovernmental
organizations), who exert discontent with the status quo of
conservation (the K phase) and desire a “common good” that
includes social justice and cohesion, participatory governance,
and well-being for all. At the end, the reorganization phase (α)
becomes a competition or negotiation between potential
directions and outcomes (including conservative leanings and
intentional bottom-up change) to restore the former system.
Hence, the back loops are more a step-wise transition in which
the direction is foreseen and occurs cumulatively, rather than a
collapse that may have not been foreseen by many in power.

Taking the city of Barcelona in Spain as an example, we analyze
two recurring cycles of urban change (from 1953 to 1979, and
thereafter) using Holling’s (1986) adaptive cycle theory. This
theory examines the dynamics and resilience of ecological and
social-ecological systems using a four-phase adaptive cycle, which
can be divided in two distinct loops. The front loop includes
“exploitation” or growth (the r phase), and “conservation” or
consolidation (the K phase). The back loop includes “collapse”
or release (the Ω phase), and “innovation” or reorganization (the
α phase).

Through our analysis, we identify the key role of small, fastresponding systems (the urban social networks) in the resilient
development of the city of Barcelona, and bring to light the
relevance of the intra- and cross-scale linkages between the city’s
institutional networks, local neighborhoods, and urban social
movements, as well as the key actors, in achieving sustainable
development. In particular, we observe that the heterogeneity of
the urban social movements (shadow groups) fosters learning and
social innovation (Parés et al. 2017; M. Parés, R. Martínez, and
I. Blanco, unpublished manuscript, http://www.univ-paris-est.fr/
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fichiers/candidatures/180-1401983313-city_futures_Barcelona_def.
pdf) and gives them the flexibility that the front loop’s dominant
groups lack to trigger growing pressures for transformation, not
only within, but also across spatial scales and time dimensions,
promoting a cross-scale process of revolt and stabilization, also
known as panarchy (Gunderson and Holling 2002).
Since the mid-2000s, research on urban resilience has flourished.
From the theoretical perspective, several authors have highlighted
that, because cities are social-ecological adaptive complex systems
managed by humans and organizations, ecological models
analyzing urban ecosystems ought to include social interactions
(Alberti et al. 2003, Marzluff et al. 2008). Consistent with this,
other authors have modeled cities as heterogeneous, multiscale
social-ecological systems with heavily intertwined spatial
dimensions (Pickett et al. 2004, Grimm et al. 2008, Ernstson et
al. 2010). Interestingly, Bristow and Healey (2014) emphasize that
urban policies’ success or failure in promoting sustainable
development relies on the knowledge and preferences of the city’s
diverse composition of agents, entities, and networks; and Marcus
and Colding (2014) argue for the need to use the adaptive cycle
theory as a tool of analysis for urban systems. Most recently,
Herrmann et al. (2016) use the adaptive cycle theory and panarchy
to compare the growth and collapse of cities, highlighting the
complementarities of the two phases, as well as their temporal
and spatial dimensions.
Despite these recent developments in urban resilience, urban
studies have seldom used Holling’s adaptive cycle theory to
examine the dynamics and resilience of urban planning (Schlappa
and Neill 2013, Marcus and Colding 2014) and urban
environments (Chaffin et al. 2016). This is our main contribution.
In particular, the novelty of our analysis is to focus on real estate
dynamics and associated policy when analyzing a city’s adaptive
cycle. In doing so, we merge urban dynamics with the adaptive
cycle of the social-ecological complex systems (Holling and
Goldberg 1971). As with others, our use of “the adaptive cycle
model is not intended as a predictive or quantitative model, rather
as a conceptual tool and approach focusing on system behavior”
(Soane et al. 2012). Despite these challenges, the panarchy model
can offer a powerful narrative with practical implications for
better understanding the vulnerabilities and windows of
opportunity of real estate dynamics. To the best of our knowledge,
our study complements work from Pelling and Manuel-Navarette
(2011), who use the adaptive cycle to analyze the vulnerability of
two coastal cities in Mexico to climate change; Bures and
Kanapaux (2011), who analyze Charleston’s (USA) urban cycles
of change to wars and climate change; Abel et al. (2006), who
explore processes of release and reorganization in cattle and
wildlife ranching in Zimbawe and an Aboriginal hunter-gatherer
system and a pastoral one in Australia; and Chaffin et al. (2016),
who explain how transformative governance of Cleveland (USA)
watersheds can help manage the social-ecological resilience of
Lake Erie.
TWO URBAN ERAS
Our focus is on the adaptive cycle’s Ω and α phases of two urban
eras from Barcelona (1953–1979 and 1980–2016). Appendix
Tables A.1 to A.3 summarize the evidence discussed below by
subsystem type.

Urban planning era: 1953–1979
After two decades of autarchy and economic stagnation, the
Spanish dictator, Francisco Franco, drastically changed his
economic policy by opening the economy. Economic
liberalization, substantial U.S. economic aid, soaring tourism,
and remittances from Spaniards working abroad paid for the
country’s industrialization and economic expansion. Between
1950 and 1970, the share of the Spanish labor force working in
the industrial sector grew from 23.5% to 34.6%, with a heavy
concentration in the industries in Bilbao, Barcelona, and the
capital, Madrid (Ferrer and Nel·lo 1998). At the same time, the
use of land and natural resources soared, with the construction
of rainwater reservoirs and nuclear plants. During this expansion,
Spain was in the r phase, a phase of growth and exponential
change, with its gross domestic product (GDP) growing an
average of 8.6% from 1961 to 1966, and 5.8% from 1967 to 1972.
The mid-1950s industrialization of Barcelona, a city in the
northeast of Spain, attracted an impressive inflow of rural
immigrants from all over Spain. As a consequence, Barcelona’s
population grew from 1.28 million inhabitants in 1950 to 1.75
million in 1970 (Ferrer and Nel·lo 1998), generating a huge
housing deficit (Tatjer and Larrea 2010). To stimulate new
housing construction, the Spanish government liberalized
housing policy by offering loans, subsidies, and fiscal exemptions
to developers, transferring most housing production to the private
sector (Díaz Hernández and Parreño Castellano 2006). At the
metropolitan level, the government approved in 1953 the Plan
Comarcal de Barcelona (Barcelona District Plan; BDP53
hereafter), with the objectives of densifying the existing urban
fabric in the suburban areas of Gràcia, Sarrià, Sants, and Sant
Andreu, and replacing the 1920s shantytowns with housing
superblocks (polígonos de viviendas) in the periphery of the city
(Oyón 1998, Busquets 2005). As a result, Barcelona’s housing
stock tripled from 1950 to 1975 (Ferrer and Nel·lo 1998). As in
the rest of Spain, Barcelona was in the entrepreneurial
exploitation phase (r phase) in which social capital positions and
coalitions were being consolidated, generating fewer but more
marked differences (Pelling and Manuel-Navarette 2011).
As Barcelona moved from the r to the K phase, dominant social
actors under the influence of higher scales of power established
a new social, organizational, and institutional equilibrium
(Pelling and Manuel-Navarette 2011). A loophole allowed
municipalities to override the BDP53 plan with “partial plans,”
to the advantage of private developers well connected to the
regime’s power structure (Calavita and Ferrer 2000, Herce 2013).
During the 16-year mandate of Mayor Porcioles (1957–1973),
residential housing was constructed in areas initially reserved for
green spaces and public facilities, and housing densities frequently
exceeded the maximum threshold of 400 units/ha (Ferrer and Nel·
lo 1998, Solans 1996). During the K phase, organizations and
institutions consolidated but lost flexibility. At the same time,
overexploitation and overdensification built up social pressure
and increased the system’s vulnerabilities.
Urban real estate development and urban social movements
Barcelona’s urban planning practice led to formal and functional
conflicts that spawned its urban social movements (Busquets
1992, Solà-Morales 1997). A meager supply of green spaces and
public facilities, and deficient lighting and sanitation conditions
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accompanied the heavy densification of the suburbs (Huges
1993). The social and well-being conditions in the housing
superblocks and shantytowns were considerably worse than
elsewhere because these settlements emerged in isolated, poorly
built, and deficiently developed areas in the periphery of the city.
The extreme densification of Barcelona mixed with the meager
supply of public goods generated poor living conditions, social
segregation, and deep social conflicts that spawned urban social
networks (Calavita and Ferrer 2000).
In the late 1960s, and despite the lack of social freedom, these
networks led Barcelona’s neighborhood associations (comisiones
de barrios) through different forms of protests, including rallies,
urban actions, marches, and traffic interruptions. At the same
time, unions, (illegal) political parties, university students, and
professional associations contributed to a wider city-level protest
movement against the political regime. Social networks were
becoming essential in connecting different sources of information
and, hence, bringing together different forms of knowledge across
Barcelona’s neighborhoods.

. Industrial sector crisis: During the 1960s, the industrial
sector was restructured and relocated outside the city as
industries occupying high-value land became obsolete (Soja
et al. 1983). At the same time, investments flew from
industrial to real estate capital, further reducing Barcelona’s
industrial growth potential. With the 1973 crisis, Barcelona’s
industrial crisis worsened and expanded to the construction
sector (Ferrer and Nel·lo 1998). Soon thereafter, Barcelona’s
unemployment rate soared to > 20%, further deepening the
housing and public infrastructure crises, worsening living
conditions, increasing social segregation, and raising social
conflict (Trullén 1988). By bringing the price of land down,
the economic recession exacerbated developers’ access to
capital (Calavita and Ferrer 2000).

What caused the first creative destruction (Ω) phase?
The following events encouraged the decline of natural resources
and political, industrial, and real estate capital, and exacerbated
the socioeconomic vulnerability of Barcelona.

. The Barcelona Metropolitan Master Plan: The new
Barcelona Metropolitan Master Plan (BMMP76) replaced
an obsolete BDP53. Its objectives were twofold: “to reduce
the allowable densities by half ” and “to reclaim land for
public use by designating various parcels of land for parks,
schools and other public facilities” (Calavita and Ferrer
2000). Its architect explained that “for the first time, there
was a coherent plan that established intensities and densities
of development (...) based on the introduction of legal
controls that regulated the city growth” (Solans 1996).

. Natural capital collapse: The 1950s to 1970s urban
development also caused an environmental crisis because of
the rising demand of resources and the massive emission of
air, soil, and water pollution. Examples of such crises include
the collapse of the Can Clos landfill in Montjuïch; the failure
of the Besos waste-water treatment plant and subsequent
pollution of the Mediterranean; the elevated flooding risks
of many suburbs; and the high levels of air, soil, and
groundwater pollution resulting from industrial production
and the extraction of minerals from the Creueta del Coll
quarry.

What was the nature of the first creative destruction (Ω) phase?
Despite its breakthrough in urban planning, a first version of the
BMMP76, released in 1974, was disliked by both neighborhood
associations and the private sector. The former criticized the
proposed thoroughfares, which divided neighborhoods and
affected thousands of homes, and the insufficient public-use land.
The latter feared downward pressure in land prices and profit
losses. In all, 32,000 allegations were presented, and the plan was
revised thoroughly before its final publication in 1976.

. The strength of Barcelona urban social networks: By the late
1960s, the urban social networks spread across the new local
neighborhood commissions, influencing the neighborhood
associations that were heavily involved in both social and
urban city planning issues. For example, the urban social
networks occupied the city hall to protest against a “partial
plan” that would have destroyed 4730 homes in 1973. As a
result of their success, mayor Porcioles was demoted
(Calavita and Ferrer 2000). At the same time, printed media
such as CAU (Construcción, arquitectura, urbanism),
Quaderns, and Novatecnia “established a rigorous, critical
discussion of Barcelona’s urban problems during the 1970s,”
building social networks and contributing to Barcelona’s
human and cultural capital (Busquets 2005).
. End of the dictatorship in 1975: At a higher level of
governance, the fight against the dictatorship unified the
urban social movements by giving them a common target
for dissention. As the society sensed that Franco’s regime
was arriving to its end, its harshness decreased (Castells
1983). The dictatorship’s weakening was apparent in many
facets of life such as the normalization of imported foreign
books and journals and the frequent and broad-scale social
protests and objecting initiatives.

These allegations signal the beginning of the creative destruction
(Ω) phase, which was fueled by the urban social movements. To
put it differently, the strength of the revolt of Barcelona’s urban
social movements promoted the first window of opportunity for
change. The neighborhood associations’ constant protests at
different spatial scales (neighborhoods), i.e., from the destruction
of the Plaça Lesseps because of the construction of the first
beltway, to the sewer line demands in the shantytowns of Torre
Baró, generated a city-wide intangible network that released social
capital, which was scarce after 35 years of political repression.
The turmoil that accompanied the 32,000 allegations also brought
about political upheaval at the municipal level, weakening the
regime’s political capital and eventually restructuring it. Because
of the wide social opposition to the 1974 BMMP, an intransigent
Mayor (Viola), well connected to the regime’s power structure,
replaced a benevolent one (Masó). However, the persistent
neighborhood associations’ complaints regarding real estate
speculation caused Viola’s quick demotion and replacement by
yet another mayor (Socias) in 1976.
The political uncertainty that accompanied the transition to
democracy and fears of socialism and property expropriation
further pushed land prices downward (Calavita and Ferrer 2000).
Overall, the economic slowdown led to an appreciable change in
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population dynamics, with decreases in both fertility and
immigration (Ferrer and Nel·lo 1998).
In addition to the neighborhood associations, other urban social
movements released social capital, generating cross-system
linkages. For instance, local initiatives involving transdisciplinary
participatory processes, including architects, sociologists,
journalists, and neighbors, developed Social Plans (Planes
Populares), with the objective of compiling their multiple
objections to the 1974 BMMP (Magro 2014). The delivery of the
Social Plans to the local administration set the beginning of the
reorganization (α) phase.
What was the nature of the first reorganization (α) process?
With Franco’s death in 1975, parliamentary elections and the
restoration of the Generalitat de Catalunya in 1977, and the
implementation of the BMMP76, reorganization was on its way.
Reorganization was facilitated by: (1) leaders and transformational
agents of change who emerged in the neighborhoods and
organized through neighborhood associations, (2) urban
development protests that became a common platform action
against speculation, (3) a sincere attempt from political leaders
to turn the protests of the urban social networks and local
community-led organizations into effective technical proposals
such as the Social Plans, (4) a larger than expected funds transfer
from the Spanish government allowing the city to buy close to
221 ha for public use for 3 billion pesetas (~USD $20 million;
Solans 1979), and (5) broad-scope debates regarding Catalan
culture, spanning from language to theater, architecture, and
regional planning (Congrés de Cultura Catalana 1978).
With democracy, newly acquired public-use land, and a
democratically elected (progressive) mayor in 1979, many young
architects (led by the new urban planning director, Oriol Bohigas)
designed almost 200 parks, plazas, and other public facilities
during the 1980s (Buchanan 1984) with two objectives. The first
objective was to respond promptly to citizens’ demands by
efficiently designing and building what was most needed,
including public spaces for civic and political participation. The
second objective was to obtain both local and international
recognition that would fuel local enthusiasm, build a reinvented
local culture and urban identity (McNeill 1999), and advance a
new Barcelona style (Julier 1996, Narotzky 2007).
According to the engineer of the BMMP76, Albert Serratosa, the
neighborhood associations “were the real protagonists (...) in
resisting the attacks on the most essential aspects of the plan [the
BMMP] on the part of powerful pressure groups” (Huertas 1997).
He also credited citizens for defending the BMMP76 by “building
cross-scale interactions between citizens, experts, practitioners
and politicians.” Hence, the revolt of the urban social networks
fostered the adaptive capacity of multiple neighborhood
community-led actions, generating a cross-scale nested set of
system dynamics (panarchy). In other words, the actions of both
small- and intermediate-scale systems triggered a critical change
to a larger scale system (the government of Barcelona) through
a bottom-up process.
Although the transition from the BDP53 to the BMMP76
triggered the creative destruction (Ω) phase, the preconditions for
the reorganization (α) phase were in place when the stress
accumulated, and the system transformed into an exploitation (r)

phase, with new social and political capital replacing the old
regime’s political capital, and young technocrats and architects
developing and regulating another real estate growth in the city.
Despite the long-lasting economic recession (1974–1985), public
infrastructure in Barcelona soared, correcting a long-lived deficit.
The new r phase of growth and exponential change had begun.
Urban (sustainable) design era: 1980–2016
The second r phase: redressing Barcelona’s imbalances in the
midst of an economic recession: 1980–1985
“The critical discussion of the 1970s that spoke out against
speculative urban development projects” guaranteed that “the
major intervention projects [of the 1980s and early 1990s] were
seen as a strategy to redress balance” (Busquets 2005), foster social
cohesion, and create a “sense of belonging to the city” (GarcíaRamon and Albet 2000). Furthermore, “Barcelona’s urban
regeneration program coincided with a wider program of building
democratic citizenship in Spain with the implementation of
national welfare policies favoring education, training and health”
(Degen and García 2012). At the same time, to confront the
economic recession and demographic stagnation, the local
administration covered basic services and improved the poor
living conditions inherited from the Porcioles era (Ferrer and Nel·
lo 1998).
To address Barcelona’s former urban deficits, its first two
democratic mayors, Serra (1979–1982) and Maragall (1982–
1997), prompted a massive relaunch of Barcelona at different,
highly intertwined scales of action (Busquets 2005). Initially, these
actions targeted small-scale problems brought up by the
neighborhood associations, such as the lack of green areas and
the need for urban rehabilitation alternatives compatible with the
distinct fabrics in the Ciutat Vella (old town), Eixample, and the
suburban areas of Barcelona.
European Union integration and Barcelona’s nomination to host
the Olympic Games: 1986–1995
With the 1981 liberalization of the mortgage market and the 1986
Spanish integration to the European Union, Spain underwent
radical economic changes, improving economic confidence,
boosting corporate investment and employment, and increasing
household income and consumption. Barcelona led the country’s
economic expansion, thanks to its 1986 nomination to host the
1992 Olympic Games, boosting public regional and national
investment to finance the city’s large-scale public works (García
and Claver 2003) and attracting private investment. Subsequently,
the price of land escalated housing prices in certain sought-after
neighborhoods and resumed the gentrification process that had
stalled during the economic recession. Within a year (from 1987
to 1988), housing prices increased by 51% in Eixample and 100%
in the neighborhoods of Diagonal and Pedralbes (Calavita and
Ferrer 2000). Barcelona was again in the r phase of growth and
exponential change.
In 1988, the “Plan for Hotels” laid the foundation for converting
Barcelona into a tourist attraction. It was the beginning of a new
economic growth model for Barcelona based on construction,
tourism, and service sectors (Degen and García 2012). The
construction of new public spaces as well as the celebration of
cultural events in different neighborhoods connected segregated
areas of the city and gathered residents from different
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neighborhoods on common ground, enhancing social cohesion
and citizen involvement. As Degen and García (2012) explain,
social diversity replaced social and spatial segregation, urban
identity was built around “Barcelonity” and the “discourse of
class was replaced with one of municipal citizenship” (McNeill
2003), generating “a common democratic culture” (Mascarell
2007). At the same time, to implement education, health, and
social services, Barcelona built a complex multilevel governance
model, integrating the municipal government with other local
administrations (regional and provincial) as well as social partners
(business and trade unions) and nongovernmental organizations,
and financed with funds from regional, national, and European
institutions (Truñó 2000).
The decline in bottom-up participatory democratic governance
With the democratization of the Spanish political system, the
political opposition dimmed, and Barcelona’s urban social
networks and local community-led organizations progressively
lost their potential and connectedness (explained in Appendix
Table A.4). The neighborhood associations and trade unions also
became less influential in Barcelona’s governance. The system had
again reached highly institutionalized stability (K), “in which
dominant social structures and social agency were well aligned
and reinforcing” (Pelling and Manuel-Navarette 2011).
Importantly, the strong influence of technical experts in the city’s
strategic planning combined with the loose or indirect public
involvement left little room for democratic control of changes in
urban development. Marshall (2000) underscores that the
municipal regulation whose objective was to give voice to the
neighborhood associations in the municipal meetings (ordenanza
municipal de Calidad de Vida y de Participación Ciudadana) was
never applied because of fears that it would slow down the
implementation of urban projects.
Barcelona’s governance model was “only consensual or
collaborative because certain power elites were in effect deciding”
(Marshall 2000), as the organization of Barcelona’s Olympic
Games exemplifies. The authoritarian tradition from the
Porcioles era (remember process) combined with the
exceptionality and grandiosity of the Olympic project and the
pressing deadline of July 1992 “justified” rigid, inflexible, and
top-down decision making in the implementation of the Olympic
infrastructure.
Neoliberalism and the housing bubble: 1996–2008
Starting in 1995, Spain experienced a decade of loose lending and
falling interest rates as a result of both Spain’s entry into the
European Monetary System and fierce competition across
financial institutions (Rodríguez-Planas 2018). Households’
willingness to take on mortgage debt soared, with mortgages
representing from 40% of disposable income in 2000 to 92% in
2007 (Henn et al. 2009). The increased housing demand, coupled
with the underdeveloped rental market, further boosted the real
estate demand, developing a housing bubble, with housing prices
increasing 175% between 1998 and 2008 (Henn et al. 2009). At
the political level, the conservative party (Partido Popular) won
the Spanish general elections in 1996, setting the ground for a
shift toward more neoliberal policies such as liberalizing the land
in 1998.
The construction of the Olympic Village initiated a new phase of
housing development led by private developers and resulting in

high market prices (Degen and García 2012). PPPs marked a
change in urban planning priorities because they limited urban
planners’ potential to include social and environmental goals that
could discourage developers. With the new century, this new
model consolidated, especially after the arrival of the new
conservative (Convergencia i Unió) Mayor Trias in 2011. Despite
the major economic slowdown that followed the 2008 financial
crisis, Barcelona’s local government continued to pursue a growth
model that sought international investment through making
Barcelona a reference for “smart cities” and a center for tourism
(Degen and García 2012). Long forgotten were the days when
Barcelona’s urban regeneration had, as its main objectives,
reaching social cohesion, reducing income inequality, and
addressing the growing city’s welfare problems.
What caused the second creative destruction (Ω) phase?
The following elements resulted in the creative destruction (Ω)
and reorganization (α) phases:
. Breakdown of the internal consensus model between the
governing coalition and citizens: With the Forum 2004 and
Diagonal-Mar projects, the Barcelona Model gave way to a
model of aggressive entrepreneurial urban regeneration that
disregarded citizens’ needs and voices (Mascarell 2007,
Miles 2008, and Borja 2010). The criticism that economic
considerations and developers’ greed rather than citizens’
needs were driving Barcelona’s urban planning became
frequent and widely shared among residents, local
newspapers, and academics (von Heeren 2002, Union
Temporal d’Escribes 2004, Delgado 2007, Parés et al. 2017).
. Rising house prices and urban sprawl: Because of the real
estate boom, young people seeking more affordable housing
began moving out of Barcelona, generating urban sprawl.
Urban planning of the metropolitan region had been
overlooked and did not follow a general plan, and thus, the
region’s development was chaotic (Monclús 2003). This
situation, added to an inefficient network of public
transportation, generated massive citizens’ objections and
frustration (Muñoz 2008).
. Weakening of the inclusive governance model: Several highly
criticized projects (Forum, Barça 2000, El Forat de la
Vergonya, and El PERI de la Barceloneta) brought to light
the municipality’s governance crisis (Capel 2010). The agony
of Barcelona’s inclusive governance model became apparent
with the referendum to reform the Diagonal fiasco in 2010,
and the demission of the Ciutat Vella council, Itziar
González, because of mafia threats regarding municipal real
estate licenses. Both citizens and the local press denounced
the weakening of the inclusiveness of the governance model,
as well as Ciutat Vella’s gentrification and the unaffordable
housing prices in the periphery (La Vanguardia 2007,
Pellicer 2008).
. Rising conflicts between different social groups: As Barcelona
developed a booming tourist industry, its citizens became
increasingly frustrated with the uses and meaning of public
spaces (García and Claver 2003). Barcelona’s soaring
overnight stays, from 3.8 million in 1990 to 12.4 million in
2008 (Turisme de Barcelona 2015), generated escalating
tensions over the local residents’ “right to sleep” vs. tourists’
“right to enjoy a Mediterranean nightlife” (Degen 2004). In
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addition, Spain experienced a major inflow of international
labor-based immigrants, who were quick to find jobs in the
thriving economy (Rodríguez-Planas 2012); however, with
the 2008 recession, they were among the first to lose their
precarious jobs (Rodríguez-Planas and Nollenberger 2016).
Thereafter, both tourism and immigration competed for the
municipalities’ attention at a time when local citizens’ needs
rose, increasing social conflict and threatening social
cohesion (Delgado 2007). Partly as a response to the
austerity measures from both the regional Catalan and
Spanish governments, a leftist proindependence party, CUP,
gained momentum and citizens’ support.
. Global financial crisis and bursting of the Spanish real estate
bubble: After the international financial crisis, the Spanish
economy suffered a major reverse with the bursting of the
Spanish real estate bubble in 2008 (García 2010).
Subsequently, small and medium-sized firms found it
extremely difficult to obtain credit, and households’
consumption plummeted. GDP growth collapsed, the
unemployment rate soared to 23%, income inequality rose,
and poverty escalated. In Barcelona, construction work
stopped, and lots and many buildings were left vacant or
idle, creating a window of opportunity for shadow networks
to occupy the empty spaces.
. New urban social networks: Squatters began settling in
Barcelona in the mid-1980s, and later, spread across the city.
They created Squatters’ Social Centers (Centros Sociales
Okupas) that offered alternative infrastructure and services
in occupied spaces (Martínez 2007, Capel 2010). The
cooperative movement, with a long tradition in Spain,
reemerged in Barcelona in the 1990s with Coop57, a
cooperative created by workers displaced by the closing of
the Editorial Bruguera publishing house in Sants. During
2005–2009, this movement expanded across the city
(Magrinyà and De Balanzó 2015). After 2006, an important
new urban social movement emerged, requesting decent and
affordable housing for all.

What was the nature of the second creative destruction (Ω)
phase?
The 15M movement, a wave of social mobilization that started
on 15 May 2011 and “featured some of the largest occupation of
public plazas since the country transitioned to democracy”
(Fuster Morell 2012), set the beginning of the release (Ω) phase.
In Barcelona, the occupation of Plaça Catalunya lasted more than
two weeks, and thereafter moved to neighborhood plazas across
the city. While many participants had no previous political
experience and were mobilized through social networks, others
came from the urban movements, bringing with them their former
mobilization trajectories as well as their accumulation of
knowledge (Fuster Morell 2012, Nel·lo 2016). Social knowledge
and behavior, as well as social memory, learning, and
communication strongly influenced social resilience and shaped
public opinion first, local neighborhood community-led
organizations second, and municipal and governmental agencies
later. According to Fuster Morell (2012) and Magrinyà and De
Balanzó (2017), the urban movements that became most relevant
during the 15M movement were: the Squatters’ Social Centers

(created in 1986), the Cooperative movement (Coop 96, running
since 1996), the Housing movement (Observatori DESC and V
de Vivienda, existing since 2004), the Platform for People Affected
by Mortgages (PAH, founded in 2009), and the left-wing proCatalan independence assembly-based political organization,
CUP (created in 2002). The latter two movements would
eventually shape governmental institutions by becoming key
players in both the municipal (2015) and regional (2012 and 2015)
governments.
Leaders from these movements were the transformational agents
from the shadow networks that led the 15M movement. The 15M
movement became particularly relevant to the creative destructive
(Ω) phase once it migrated to the different neighborhoods because
this implied the creation of solidarity exchange networks (such
as the time bank), the sharing of knowledge, new public-space
uses, the exchange of goods, and the creation of energy
cooperatives, as well as cooperatives of agro-ecological
consumption (Ubasart et al. 2009). As Fuster Morell (2012)
explains, “the plazas were like living cities, and managing the
squares involved many skills.” Most importantly, the 15M
movement reenergized neighborhood networks by connecting old
neighborhood associations with social networks associated with
specific environmental initiatives or urban and housing projects,
hence engaging those who had participated in the first urban
social movements and generating synergies and conversational
flows.
What was the nature of the second reorganization (α) process?
The 15M process culminated on 11 June 2011 with the municipal
council offering Can Batlló (bloc 11), one of the plants of an
obsolete textile factory, to the Neighborhood Association of La
Bordeta and the Social Center of Sants so they could use it as a
social center (Subirats 2015, Parés et al. 2017, Eizaguirre and Parés
2018). This victory created a unique comprehensive social center
with a start-up of nongovernmental organizations (Coópolis), a
public housing project, and a library. Can Batlló became an
inspiration to Barcelona’s neighborhood associations, social
centers, and the cooperative movement, and provoked many other
emerging urban actions. All together, these actions translated into
the Neighborhood Platforms and Assemblies created by the 15M
movement, as well as bottom-up projects such as the Vallcarca
strategic social plan “The Neighborhood We Want” (el Barri que
Volem) in 2013 and 2014 (Observatori de Vallcarca 2015).
Additionally, the 2013 top-down municipal initiative Pla BUITS,
aiming at temporarily allowing the use of Barcelona’s empty lots
by neighbors and nongovernmental organizations, metamorphosed
into network bottom-up experiences such as the one in
Germanetes. Crucially, Pla BUITS transferred rights to local
communities so they could develop emergent actions in tactical
urbanism at 50 empty spaces across the city (Magrinyà 2015). All
of these local initiatives converged and interacted, creating a
common framework for articulating actions through social
networks and generating multidimensional synergies that
multiplied citizens’ social support and engagement, as reflected
by several research projects and urban academic studies from
universities and research centers, such as “Observatorio Urbano
del Conflicto Urbano,” “Movement Transition Towns,” “Barrios
en Crisis,” “BCN Comuns,” and “POLURB 2015” (De Balanzó
2017).
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With these emerging initiatives, the reorganization (α) phase was
on its way. It was facilitated by: (1) leaders and transformational
agents of change who emerged in the neighborhoods and
generated, thanks to the 15M movement, synergies and networks
that opened a window of opportunity for change; (2) protests
against housing evictions and in favor of decent and affordable
housing metamorphosing into a platform against real estate
speculation (DPH 2006); (3) a sincere attempt from local
assemblies to turn the urban social movements’ protests into
effective urban planning proposals such as the “new version” of
Social Plans, “The Neighborhood We Want” plans; (5) broadscope debates regarding collective Catalan patrimony and public
assets (Forum Veïnal); and (6) rising popular support for Catalan
self-determination led by the left-wing local CUP assemblies.

bourgeoisie well connected to the dictatorial regime in the first
era; and national and international private investors and
municipality technocrats in the second era) came to dominate the
system. During the K phase, resources (land, housing, green
spaces, public infrastructure, and wealth) became scarce for
“new” (and old) entities such as youth, immigrants, the working
and middle class, and industry, and the system lost its flexibility,
as reflected by the rise in social injustice, discontent, and social
conflict, increasing the likelihood of the system collapsing. The
dark arrows (4 and 14 in Fig. 1) reflect the revolt process
(panarchy) initiated by heterogeneous small- and intermediatescale systems that take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the
large-scale systems to generate windows of opportunity to trigger
growing pressures for transformation.

Hence, these local social networks’ revolt fostered the adaptive
capacity of multiple community-led local actions, generating
social capital within and across spatial scales (panarchy). Actions
of small- and intermediate-scale systems triggered a
transformational change into larger scale systems (the city
government) through a bottom-up process. In 2014, a new party
that emerged from the shadow networks, Barcelona en Comú, was
created, marking the end of the reorganization (α) phase. As in
the 1970s, when the new democratic government absorbed
transformational leaders, the transformational leaders of the
second α phase entered the municipal administration when the
spokesperson of PAH was elected Mayor of Barcelona in 2015.
In these same elections, CUP entered Barcelona’s local
government with 7.4% of the votes. Mayor Colau and her team
are currently leading the new transformation of Barcelona’s
urban dynamic. Whether they will succeed in achieving a new
urban “common good” remains to be seen.

Back loop
Economic and governance disruption (1973 crisis and Franco’s
death during the first era; the Great Recession, the bursting of
the real estate bubble, and Barcelona’s model of aggressive
entrepreneurial urban regeneration during the second era)
increased the system’s vulnerabilities by releasing capital.
Crucially, in both eras, the Ω phase was triggered by a disturbance
in the social domain: the 1974 revision of the BDP53 (5 in Fig.
1) and the 15M movement (15 in Fig. 1). In both cases, shadow
groups (urban social networks) led by transformational agents
(neighborhood associations and new democratic political groups
in the former case; squatter, cooperative, public space, PAH,
housing, and CUP movements in the latter case) depleted the
political capital that had accumulated during the Barcelona of
Porcioles and the PPP–urban-development era (6 and 16 in Fig.
1). In addition, in both cases, political leaders or local assemblies
turned the urban social movements’ protests into effective urban
planning proposals such as the Social Plans in 1976–1979 or “The
Neighborhood We Want” plans in 2012–2015 (7 and 17 in Fig.
1). It is noteworthy that enough social capital (social networks,
trust, and human capital) was retained during Barcelona’s back
loops for the following adaptive cycles. For instance, the
neighborhood associations’ social capital from the 1970s built
“cross-scale interactions between citizens, experts, practitioners
and politicians” most relevant in “resisting the attacks on the most
essential aspects of the [BMMP] plan on the part of powerful
pressure groups” (Serratosa 1996), and hence, enabled Barcelona’s
urban regeneration and social cohesion during the late 1970s and
1980s (8–10 in Fig. 1). The dark arrows (9 and 19 in Fig. 1) reflect
the “remember” process (panarchy) from large-scale systems that
restores stability and dominance of conservative leanings through
the creation of new municipal institutions.

BARCELONA’S ADAPTIVE CYCLES
Both adaptive cycles of Barcelona’s social-ecological system
conform to the basic sequence of change in the adaptive cycle
theory: a growth phase (r), followed by a consolidation phase (K),
prior to a release (Ω) event, that leads to the reorganization (α)
phase. The novelty of our analysis has been to focus on
Barcelona’s real estate dynamics and associated policy. Below, we
summarize the main analysis (Fig. 1).
Front loop
In the case of Barcelona’s real estate adaptive cycles, the front
loop is long. Financial and natural capital is plentiful, and fastgrowing entities (private developers, politicians, and technocrats)
take advantage of these resources to dominate the system
efficiently. During the 1960s and 1970s, abundant financial capital
added to economic liberalization set the ground for Barcelona’s
massive urban sprawl and densification. In the 1980s and 1990s,
the democratic transition funds and newly acquired public-use
land, a well as the European Union and European Monetary
Union entry and international investments, were the basis for PPP
urban development. In the 1960s and 1970s, private developers
abused their contacts with the dictatorial regime to develop
massive urban sprawl and densification via “Partial Plans;” and
in the 1980s and 1990s, technocrats and private developers
pursued a growth model based on a knowledge economy and
tourism industry (1–3 and 11–13, respectively, in Fig. 1).
As the adaptive urban complex system matured, several
homogeneous social groups (private developers and the

CONCLUSION
We used adaptive cycle theory to improve the understanding of
Barcelona’s real estate dynamics and related policy. Specifically,
we explored the vulnerabilities and windows of opportunity these
cycles of change introduced in the release and reorganization
phases. In the two recurring cycles of urban change analyzed, we
observe two complementary and opposing loops. During the front
loop, resources are efficiently exploited by homogenous dominant
groups with the objective of promoting capital accumulation
based on private or PPP investments. During the back loop,
change is catalyzed by Barcelona’s heterogeneous social groups
(urban social networks and the third sector), whose objectives are
diverse and uncertain but converge in their discontent with the
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Fig. 1. Barcelona’s adaptive cycles from 1953 to 2016.
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status quo of the conservation (K) phase and their desire for a
“common good” that aims at social justice, social cohesion,
participatory governance, and well-being for all. At the end, the
reorganization phase (α) becomes a competition or negotiation
between potential directions and outcomes, including
conservative leanings, that restores the former system.
In our analysis, we observed that disturbances at the smallest scale
(rallies, marches, urban actions, participatory processes, and
litigations) affect the intermediate scale (neighborhood
community-based organizations) and may well have a bottom-up
influence on larger, slow-responding scales (municipal and
regional institutions), especially when multiple revolts from
smaller and intermediate systems destabilize and erode the
apparent stability of the larger systems. We also observed that
disturbances of larger scale systems (city’s political changes,
economic crisis, dictator’s death) can have a top-down influence
on smaller scale systems. Smaller and nested systems reorganize
under the influence of larger scale systems, and social memory
and hierarchical constraints determine the way societies
reorganize.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the heterogeneity of shadow groups
fosters learning and innovation and gives them the flexibility that
the front loop’s dominant groups lack to trigger growing pressures
for transformation, not only within, but also across spatial and
temporal dimensions, promoting a cross-scale process of revolt
and stabilization, also known as panarchy. As such, the local
neighborhood experiences (Can Batlló, “The Neighborhood We
Want,” and Pla BUITS) escalated to network bottom-up
experiences and became city-wide emergent and socialinnovation experiences (De Balanzó 2015, 2017).

Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/10396
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Appendix Table A.1. Society Sub-System of Urban Planning and Urban (Sustainable) Design Eras

Social system

URBAN PLANNING ERA: 1950-1979

URBAN (SUSTAINABLE) DESIGN ERA: 1980-2016

1950-1970

1981-1995

1996-2016

Unemployment rate dropped from
17.75% in June 1986 to 11.6% in
September 1989.

International immigrants, grew to
represent close to one fifth of the
population by 2009 (up from less
than 2% in 1996).

Barcelona’s population soared
from 1,280,179 inhabitants in
1950 to 1,557,863 in 1960 and
1,745,142 in 1970. Most of this
growth—79% in the 1956-1960
period, 90% in the 1961-1965
period, and 57% in the 1966-1970
period—was driven by the arrival
of rural immigrants (Ferrer and
Nel.lo 1990).
The construction of housing
superblocks in isolated areas in
the periphery of the city began in
the 1950s and grew exponentially
during the 1960s and early 1970s.
Shantytowns in the outskirts of
the city continued to multiply.
By the early 1970s, Barcelona had
become one of the highest density
cities in the world with 300
habitants per ha (Tatjer 2009), and
an area per habitat as low as 34.5
square meters, a third of the
minimum
recommended
(Camarasa 1977).

1970-1980
Society
Barcelona’s population stagnated
during the 1970s as a result of
both a decrease in fertility and a
drop in immigration (Ferrer and
Nel.lo 1990).
In
the
1970s,
Barcelona’s
unemployment rate soared to
over
20
percent,
further
deepening the housing and public
infrastructure crises, worsening
living conditions, increasing the
social segregation, and rising
social conflict (Trullén 1988).
Starting in the late 1970s,
construction of a program of
democratic
citizenship
and
implementation
of
national
welfare
policies
favoring
education, training and health.

“The city’s major intervention
projects (of the 1980s and early
1990s) were seen as a strategy to
redress balance” (Busquets 2005),
foster social cohesion, and a
“sense of belonging to the city”
(García-Ramon and Albet 2000).

Aggressive entrepreneurial urban
regeneration that disregarded
citizens’ needs and voices.
Gentrification in Old Town.

Social diversity replaced social and
spatial segregation, urban identity
was built around “Barcelonity”,
and the “discourse of class was
replaced with one of municipal
citizenship”
(McNeill
2003)
generating “a common democratic
culture” in the city (Mascarell
2007).

Over time, immigrants’ low and
irregular incomes prevented or
excluded
immigrants
from
accessing
quality
housing,
segregating them in overcrowded
sublet conditions in run-down
parts of the inner city or the
periphery of Barcelona (Pareja
2005; and Terrones 2007).

The
gentrification
resumed.

Increasing social conflict among
the
different
groups
and
threatening social cohesion.

process

After
2008,
the
Spanish
unemployment rate soared to 23

1

While the bourgeoisie settled in
the Eixample and around the
Diagonal, the working class
remained in Ciutat Vella, and the
migrant workers were pushed to
the peripheral neighborhoods.

Individual
development

The dispersion of land prices
further pushed industries to the
periphery of the city, and
segregated social classes to
different areas of the city (Ferrer
and Nel.lo 1990).
Starting in the late 1960s, the
neighborhood
associations
(comisiones de barrios) led the
urban social movements through
different forms of protests.
Despite the lack of social liberties,
the
neighborhood
protests
coincided with other group’s
clandestine activities against the
political regime, contributing to a
wider protest movement at the
city level.
The fight against the dictatorship
unified
the
urban
social
movements by giving them a
common dissenting target.

percent in 2011, income inequality
rose, and poverty escalated. In
Barcelona, unemployment more
than doubled within 5 years from
7.4% in 2006 to 16.9% in 2011
(Observatorio Barcelona 2013).

In
1973,
Barcelona’s
neighborhood
associations
occupied the city hall to protest
against a Partial Plan that would
have destroyed 4,730 homes,
resulting in the successful halt of
the plan and the demotion of
Barcelona’s Mayor Porcioles the
next day by the Spanish
government (Calavita and Ferrer
2000).
Beginning in 1975, local initiatives
involving
transdisciplinary
participatory
processes
with
architects, sociologists, journalists
and neighbors developed the
Social Plans (Planes Populares)
whose objective was to collect the
different
groups’
multiple
objections to the 1974 BMMP

Urban social movements in
Barcelona progressively lost their
potential and connectedness.

Urban sprawl generated massive
citizens’ objections and frustration
in the metropolitan area.

Political opposition dimed.

Downtown Barcelona’s soaring
overnight stays from 3.8 million in
1990 to 12.4 million in 2008
(Turisme de Barcelona, 2009)
generated escalating tensions
over the local residents’ “right to
sleep” versus tourists’ “right to
enjoy a Mediterranean nightlife”
(Degen 2004).
Squatters began settling in
Barcelona in the mid-1980s, the
cooperative
movement
reemerged in Barcelona in the
1990s, and other activists and
decent
housing
movements
emerged demanding a solution to

2

Government

Totalitarian system.
Liberalization of housing policy.
The 1953 Barcelona District Plan
(BDP53) aimed at densifying the
Barcelona.
A loophole allowed municipalities
to override the BDP53 plan with
Partial Plans to the advantage of
private developers well connected
to the regime’s power structure
(Calavita and Ferrer 2000; and
Herce 2013).

(Magro 2014).

citizens’ problems.

Specialist magazines such as CAU,
Quaderns,
and
Novatecnia
“established a rigorous, critical
discussion of Barcelona’s urban
problems during the 1970s
(Busquets 2005)”, hence also
contributing
to
Barcelona’s
cultural, human and social capital.
Because of the massive opposition
to the 1974 BMMP, the Spanish
government
replaced
a
benevolent mayor (Masó) with an
intransigent one (Viola), well
connected to the regime’s power
structure.

The 15M movement.

Franco died in November 1975.
The 1976 BMPP aimed at reducing
the allowable densities from a
potential of 9 to 4.5 million
people, and reclaiming land for
public use.
Viola was soon required to resign
due to the constant neighborhood
associations’ complaints regarding
real-estate speculation going on
during the revisions of the BMMP.
In December 1976, he was
replaced by mayor Socias, who led
the city through democratic

In 2014, Barcelona en Común
(BEC) was created.

The municipality focused on
broader and more ambitious
projects, whose objective was to
address the lack of facilities and
services in Barcelona’s periphery,
and
mitigate
the
social
segregation and poor living
conditions of the “Barcelona of
Porcioles”
To implement education, health,
and social services, Barcelona built
a complex multi-level governance
model, integrating the municipal
government with other local
administrations (regional and
provincial) as well as social
partners (business and trade
unions) and NGOs, and financed
with funds from regional, national
and European institutions (Truño
2000).
Beginning

in

the

mid-1980s,

Shift towards more neoliberal
policies as a result of the
conservative
party
(Partido
Popular) winning the Spanish
general elections in 1996.
Further liberalization of land in
1998.
Weakening of the
governance model.

inclusive

The new elected conservative
(Convergencia i Unió) mayor,
Xavier Trias, in 2011.
Barcelona en Común (BEC) wins
municipal elections (in coalition) in
2014.
Transformational leaders entered
the municipal administration
when Ada Colau was elected
mayor of Barcelona in 2015.

3

transition.
In 1977, Parliamentary elections
and the Generalitat de Catalunya
were restaured, and in 1979, the
democratic municipal election was
celebrated.

Barcelona’s new economic growth
model gave rise to public-private
partnershipPPPs in the area of
economic development, making
Barcelona’s urban planning and
implementation
heavily
dependent on private funding
(Marshal 2000).

Starting in the 1970s, the local
administration began covering
basic services, consequently,
improving the poors’ living
conditions.
The new democratic government
absorbed
transformational
leaders.

Appendix Table A.2. Support Sub-System of Urban Planning and Urban (Sustainable) Design Eras

Infrastructure

URBAN PLANNING ERA: 1950-1979

URBAN (SUSTAINABLE) DESIGN ERA: 1980-2016

1950-1970

1981-1995

1996-2016

In
the
1980s,
public
infrastructures
soared
in
Barcelona, replacing the city’s
deficiencies in public facilities,
green
spaces,
public
transportation, and public libraries
and schools, and reusing the
unoccupied
or
abandoned
(frequently industrial) spaces

Housing prices increased 175%
between 1998 and 2008 (Gonzalez
and Ortega 2013). In Barcelona,
the price hike was even greater
with prices for new dwellings
tripling (after adjusting prices for
inflation) from €2,035 per square
meter to €5,918 per square meter
from 1996 to 2008 (Ajuntament

The share of the Spanish labor
force working in the industrial
sector grew from 23.5% in 1950 to
34.6% in 1970. Industrialization
concentrated in the old industrial
areas of Barcelona and Bilbao, and
the capital, Madrid (Ferrer and
Nel.lo 1990).

1970-1980
Support
The economic recession also
brought the scarcity of capital for
developers bringing the price of
land down (Calavita and Ferrer
2000).
The industrial crisis and its
expansion to other sectors further
reduced Barcelona’s industrial
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Barcelona’s
housing
stock
escalated from 282,952 to
1,028,634 units (Ferrer and Nel.lo
1990). Housing densities of 560 to
800 dwelling per ha were
frequent, even though the
maximum threshold was 400
(Solans 1997).
Development
of
highway system.

Barcelona’s

Between 1960 and 1970, the
Partial Plans increased by 12% the
areas for residential use, 53%
those for industrial use, and 23%
those
for
transportation
infrastructures to the detriment of
green spaces and public facilities,
which lost 43% and 46% of the
BDP53 originally assigned space,
respectively (Ferrer and Nel.lo
1990).
The concentration of services in
Ciutat Vella, Eixample and the
area of the Diagonal, added to
Barcelona’s
radial
public
transportation system pushed up
these areas’ land prices and
widened the dispersion in land
prices across the different
neighborhoods (Nel.lo 1987).
According to Lluch and Gaspar

capital and considerably slowed
down its private sectors’ financial
capital.
The political uncertainty that
accompanied the transition to
democracy and fears of socialism
and expropriation of property also
pushed land prices down.

resulting from the industrial,
economic and political crises.
1986 nomination to host the 1992
Olympic Games boosted public
regional and national investment
to ﬁnance the city’s large-scale
public works projects and
attracted
much
private
investment to the city.
Housing prices soared. For
instance, within a year (from 1987
to 1988), housing prices increased
by 51% in l’Eixample and 100% in
Diagonal and Pedralbes (Calavita
and Ferrer 2000).

de Barcelona 2009).
Unaffordable housing prices also
expanded to the periphery.
Barcelona’s housing prices fell
12% between 2007 and 2009
(Idealista.com 2009).
The bursting of the real-estate
bubble and the halting of credit
lending led to the collapse of
Barcelona’s urban land and capital
as construction work stopped, lots
were left vacant and many
buildings idle.

In 1988, the Plan for Hotels laid
the foundations for making
Barcelona a tourist attraction and
boosting its tourist industry.
Municipal intervention aiming at
connecting and rebalancing the
different areas of the city, and
included the infrastructure of the
1992 Olympic Games. It also
implied reorganizing the road
network and defining nine areas
of new centrality, plus the arrival
of the Diagonal thoroughfare to
the sea, the use of large-scale
buildings as museums and cultural

5

Economic system

(1972), the land price in the area
of the Diagonal (2,000 pessetes el
pam quadrat) was more than 4
times that of the suburban area of
the Guinardó (450 pessetes el pam
quadrat) and 80 times greater that
of the Prat de Llobregat in the
periphery of the city (25 pessetes
el pam quadrat).
Economic liberalization.
US economic aid and intense
foreign direct investment.
Thriving tourism.
Remittances
from
working abroad.

infrastructure (theaters and the
like), the role of Old Town (Ciutat
Vella), and Barcelona’s seafront.

With the 1973 energy and
economic crises, the industrial
crisis
affecting
Barcelona
worsened and expanded to other
sectors,
especially
the
construction sector (Ferrer and
Nel.lo 1990).

Spaniards

Booming car industry.
Spanish GDP grew an average of
8.6% from 1961 to 1966, and 5.8%
from 1967 to 1972.

The economic recession lasted
from 1974 to 1985.

Liberalization of the mortgage
market in 1981.
Spanish integration to the
European Union (EU) in January
1986.
Improved economic confidence,
boosted corporate investment and
employment,
and
increased
household incomes and demand.
Consumption soared as reflected
by the doubling of new vehicles
registration from 114,077 in 1986
to 237,000 vehicles in 1989, and
the building of new housing units
from 11,621 to 26,330 (Ferrer and
Nel.lo 1990).
From 1985 to 1988, Barcelona’s
commercial electric consumption
increased by 15%, long-distance
calls rose by 74%, and the demand
of concrete escalated by 180%.

During the 1990s, Barcelona’s
(and Catalonia’s) GDP per capita
grew an average of 2.4% per year,
and 2.8% from 2000 to 2005
(Parellada 2004).
New economic growth model for
Barcelona, based on construction,
tourism and service sectors.
Entry into the European Monetary
System and loose lending result of
fierce
competition
among
financial institutions.
Interest rates fell, down-payment
requirements loosened and credit
standards tanked.
Immigrants were responsible for
20% to 25% of the gains in the
Spanish GDP per capita (Bank of
Spain 2006).
After 2008, the real-estate bubble
burst, credit lending stopped, the
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Spanish GDP growth collapsed.
Barcelona’s local government
continued to pursue a growth
model for Barcelona that sought
international investment through
making Barcelona a reference of
“smart cities”, on the one hand,
and a tourism industry, on the
other (Degen and García 2012).

Appendix Table A.3. Nature Sub-System of Urban Planning and Urban (Sustainable) Design Eras
URBAN PLANNING ERA: 1950-1979

URBAN (SUSTAINABLE) DESIGN ERA: 1980-2016

1950-1970

1981-1995

1996-2016

Barcelona’s
natural
capital
downfall accelerated as domestic
waste production increased by
32.5% in only three years (from
1985 to 1988).

2003 heat wave.

1970-1980
Nature

Resources

Environment

Massive use of land and natural
resources with the booming
construction
of
rainwater
reservoirs beginning in the 1950s
and the building of nuclear plants,
result of the mid-1950s SpanishUS treaties.
Environmental crisis due to the
rising demand of resources, and
the massive emission of air, soil
contamination,
and
water
pollutants.

The vulnerability of Barcelona’s natural capital persisted up until the
early 1990s.

2007 energy black-out.
2008 water drough and the
collapse of the sewage water
system.
Exponential growth of carbon
emissions.
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Appendix Table A.4. Reasons for Barcelona Urban Social Movements’ Loss of Potential and
Connectedness
1.

The new democratic local government had effectively addressed most of the neighborhood
associations’ claims on specific urban issues, such as lacks in education, health services, and
public spaces in the different neighborhoods.

2.

The new administration hired many of the former leaders, members, and sympathizers of the
neighborhood associations, incorporating their views in the city’s governing coalition, but also
absorbing them into the political system.

3.

The local administration provided funds and offices to the Federation of Neighborhood
Associations making their objections to the municipal power more difficult (Calavita and Ferrer
2000).

4.

The 1977 Social Compromises (Pactos Sociales) between the Spanish government, the private
sector and the labor unions set the grounds for minimum social conflict with the new
democratic government at all levels of the administration.

5.

The collective Catalan identity and new sense of place and city pride that accompanied the
urban regeneration of Barcelona (Associació Pla Estratègic Barcelona 1994; Subiros 1999;
Rodríguez Morató 2008) mitigated any objecting voices.

6.

The economic expansion, the EU entry, and the Olympic host nomination set a tone of
euphoria across the population that quiet any dissenting voices until the end of 1992.
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